Appro	ved For Release 2008/02/14 : CIA-RDP84B00049R000701850027-7	
	SECRET	25X1
	THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE	
	WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505 DDI #6692-82	
National Intelligence C	17 August 1982	
National Intelligence C	The state of the s	
MEMORANDUM FOR	: Acting Director of Central Intelligence	
FROM:	NIO/NESA	
SUBJECT:	Talking Points on Lebanon Situation Keyed on "Post-Beirut" Issues	
confronting po Syrian forces S t r K	collowing is a checklist of major issues which will be clicymakers after a successful evacuation of most PLO and under the Habib scenario: Syrian and Palestinian forces will remain in north Lebanon and the Bekaa Valley. Short of renewed fighting (see attachment), no process is currently underway to remove them. It is possible some Beirut Palestinian fighters, now to be distributed among various Arab countries, will ultimately reinfiltrate north Lebanon through Syria in these areas. Assuming Syrian and Palestinian forces remain, a non-declared solidification of Lebanon's partition would have occurred. The ethnic mix of a "central" government excluding these areas would approximate the original basis for the Lebanese state, and could render reassertion of power by a Maronite-dominated government easier. If accepted by the local parties, a big "if," there is no inherent problem in this situation for the United States. The Maronite-Shia modus vivendi, juxtaposed with the departure	
-	The Maronite-Shia modus vivendi, juxtaposed with the departure of Palestinian and Syrian troops, renders Sunni Muslim opposition to a strong Maronite president impractical in power terms. PLO stay-behinds will not be sufficient to alter this situation, and Israeli troop presence, of course, reinforces it. A pre-1975 power equation is not being recreated in the current Beirut scenario.	25X1

25X1

All portions Secret SECRET

DCI EXEC PEG

٠.	Approved For Release 2008/02/14 : CIA-RDP84B00049R000701850027-7	
	SECRET	25X
		25X
		25X
		25/

Attachment, As stated

